

Wormhole Attacks in Wireless Networks

Yih-Chun Hu, *Member, IEEE*, Adrian Perrig, *Member, IEEE*, and David B. Johnson, *Member, IEEE*

Abstract—As mobile ad hoc network applications are deployed, security emerges as a central requirement. In this paper, we introduce the *wormhole attack*, a severe attack in ad hoc networks that is particularly challenging to defend against. The wormhole attack is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any hosts, and even if all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them (possibly selectively) to another location, and retransmits them there into the network. The wormhole attack can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially against many ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems. For example, most existing ad hoc network routing protocols, without some mechanism to defend against the wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, severely disrupting communication. We present a general mechanism, called *packet leashes*, for detecting and, thus defending against wormhole attacks, and we present a specific protocol, called TIK, that implements leashes. We also discuss topology-based wormhole detection, and show that it is impossible for these approaches to detect some wormhole topologies.

Index Terms—Ad hoc networks, computer network security, computer networks, packet leash, TIK, tunneling, wireless local area network (LAN), wormhole.

I. INTRODUCTION

THE PROMISE of mobile ad hoc networks to solve challenging real-world problems continues to attract attention from industrial and academic research projects. Applications are emerging and widespread adoption is on the horizon. Most previous ad hoc networking research has focused on problems such as routing and communication, assuming a trusted environment. However, many applications run in untrusted environments and require secure communication and routing. Applications that may require secure communications include emergency response operations, military or police networks,

and safety-critical business operations such as oil drilling platforms or mining operations. For example, in emergency response operations such as after a natural disaster like a flood, tornado, hurricane, or earthquake, ad hoc networks could be used for real-time safety feedback; regular communication networks may be damaged, so emergency rescue teams might rely upon ad hoc networks for communication.

In this paper, we define a particularly challenging attack to defend against, which we call a *wormhole* attack, and we present a new, general mechanism for detecting and, thus defending against wormhole attacks. In this attack, an attacker records a packet, or individual bits from a packet, at one location in the network, tunnels the packet (possibly selectively) to another location, and replays it there. We introduce the general mechanism of *packet leashes* to detect wormhole attacks, and we present two types of leashes: *geographic leashes* and *temporal leashes*. We design an efficient authentication protocol, called TIK, for use with temporal leashes. We also analyze other detection approaches, such as *topology-based wormhole detection* [31], [40], and show that topology-based detection cannot detect some wormholes. We focus our discussion in this paper on wireless ad hoc networks, but our results are applicable more broadly to other types of networks, such as wireless local area networks (LANs) and cellular networks.

Section II of this paper presents the wormhole attack and discusses how the wormhole attack can be used against ad hoc network routing protocols. In Section III, we present our assumptions. Section IV presents leashes and discusses a general approach for detecting wormholes. Section V discusses temporal leashes in detail and presents the TIK protocol for instant wireless broadcast authentication, and Section VI provides an evaluation of TIK and packet leashes, as well as other techniques for wormhole detection. Section VII discusses related work, and Section VIII presents our conclusions.

II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

In a *wormhole attack*, an attacker receives packets at one point in the network, “tunnels” them to another point in the network, and then replays them into the network from that point. For tunneled distances longer than the normal wireless transmission range of a single hop, it is simple for the attacker to make the tunneled packet arrive with better metric than a normal multihop route, for example, through use of a single long-range directional wireless link or through a direct wired link to a colluding attacker. It is also possible for the attacker to forward each bit over the wormhole directly, without waiting for an entire packet to be received before beginning to tunnel the bits of the packet, in order to minimize delay introduced by the wormhole. Due to the nature of wireless transmission, the attacker can create a wormhole even for packets not addressed to itself, since it can

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overhear them in wireless transmission and tunnel them to the colluding attacker at the opposite end of the wormhole.

If the attacker performs this tunneling honestly and reliably, no harm is done; the attacker actually provides a useful service in connecting the network more efficiently. However, the wormhole puts the attacker in a very powerful position relative to other nodes in the network, and the attacker could exploit this position in a variety of ways. The attack can also still be performed even if the network communication provides confidentiality and authenticity, and even if the attacker has no cryptographic keys. Furthermore, the attacker is invisible at higher layers; unlike a malicious node in a routing protocol, which can often easily be named, the presence of the wormhole and the two colluding attackers at either endpoint of the wormhole are not visible in the route.

The wormhole attack is particularly dangerous against many ad hoc network routing protocols in which the nodes that hear a packet transmission directly from some node consider themselves to be in range of (and, thus a neighbor of) that node. For example, when used against an on-demand routing protocol such as dynamic source routing (DSR) [16], [17] or ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) [27], a powerful application of the wormhole attack can be mounted by tunneling each ROUTE REQUEST packet directly to the destination target node of the REQUEST. When the destination node's neighbors hear this REQUEST packet, they will follow normal routing protocol processing to rebroadcast that copy of the REQUEST, and then discard without processing all other received ROUTE REQUEST packets originating from this same route discovery. This attack, thus, prevents any routes other than through the wormhole from being discovered, and if the attacker is near the initiator of the route discovery, this attack can even prevent routes more than two hops long from being discovered. Possible ways for the attacker to then exploit the wormhole include discarding rather than forwarding all data packets, thereby creating a permanent denial-of-service (DoS) attack (no other route to the destination can be discovered as long as the attacker maintains the wormhole for ROUTE REQUEST packets), or selectively discarding or modifying certain data packets.

The neighbor discovery mechanisms of periodic (proactive) routing protocols such as dynamic destination-sequenced distance-vector (DSDV) [26], optimized link-state routing (OLSR) [33], and topology broadcast based on reverse path forwarding (TBRPF) [5] rely heavily on the reception of broadcast packets as a means for neighbor detection, and are also extremely vulnerable to this attack. For example, OLSR and TBRPF use HELLO packets for neighbor detection, so if an attacker tunnels through a wormhole to a colluding attacker near node B all HELLO packets transmitted by node A , and likewise tunnels back to the first attacker all HELLO packets transmitted by B , then A and B will believe that they are neighbors, which would cause the routing protocol to fail to find routes when they are not actually neighbors.

For DSDV, if each routing advertisement sent by node A or node B were tunneled through a wormhole between colluding attackers near these nodes, as described above, then A and B would believe that they were neighbors. If A and B , however, were not within wireless transmission range of each other, they

would be unable to communicate. Furthermore, if the best existing route from A to B were at least $2n+2$ hops long, then any node within n hops of A would be unable to communicate with B , and any node within n hops of B would be unable to communicate with A . Otherwise, suppose C were within n hops of A , but had a valid route to B . Since A advertises a metric of 1 route to B , C would hear a metric $n+1$ route to B . C will use that route if it is not within $n+1$ hops of B , in which case there would be an n -hop route from A to C , and a route of length $n+1$ from C to B , contradicting the premise that the best real route from A to B is at least $2n+2$ hops long.

In each of these protocols, the wormhole can be used to attract ad hoc network traffic, and can use this position to eavesdrop on traffic, maliciously drop packets, or to perform man-in-the-middle attacks against protocols used in the network. The wormhole attack is also dangerous in other types of wireless networks and applications. One example is any wireless access control system that is based on physical proximity, such as wireless car keys, or proximity and token-based access control systems for PCs [8], [20]. In such systems, an attacker could relay the authentication exchanges to gain unauthorized access.

III. ASSUMPTIONS, NOTATION, AND ATTACKER MODEL

The acronym "MAC" may in general stand for "medium access control" protocol or "message authentication code." To avoid confusion, we use "MAC" in this paper to refer to the network medium access control protocol at the link layer, and we use "HMAC" to refer to a message authentication code used for authentication (HMAC is a particular instance of a message authentication code [4]).

For reasons such as differences in wireless interference, transmit power, or antenna operation, links between nodes in a wireless network may at times successfully work in only one direction; such a *unidirectional* wireless link between two nodes A and B might allow A to send packets to B but not for B to send packets to A . In many cases, however, wireless links are able to operate as *bidirectional* links. A MAC protocol generally is designed to support operation over unidirectional links or is designed only for bidirectional links; the introduction of our TIK protocol does not affect the capability of the MAC protocol to operate over unidirectional links.

Security attacks on the wireless network's physical layer are beyond the scope of this paper. Spread-spectrum has been studied as a mechanism for securing the physical layer against jamming [30]. DoS attacks against MAC layer protocols are also beyond the scope of this paper; MAC layer protocols that do not employ some form of carrier sense, such as pure ALOHA and Slotted ALOHA [1], are less vulnerable to DoS attacks, although they tend to use the channel less efficiently.

We assume that the adversary can place nodes at arbitrary places in the network, and that these nodes are connected through a communication channel that is unobservable by other nodes, but follows the laws of physics (i.e., messages cannot travel faster than the speed-of-light). We assume that network nodes are not compromised, but we discuss in Section VI-B potential attacks if network nodes are compromised.

We assume that the wireless network may drop, corrupt, duplicate, or reorder packets. We also assume that the MAC layer

contains some level of redundancy to detect randomly corrupted packets; however, this mechanism is not designed to replace cryptographic authentication mechanisms.

We assume that nodes in the network may be resource constrained. Thus, in providing for wormhole detection, we use efficient *symmetric* cryptography, rather than relying on expensive *asymmetric* cryptographic operations. Especially on CPU-limited devices, symmetric cryptographic operations (such as block ciphers and hash functions) are three to four orders of magnitude faster than asymmetric cryptographic operations (such as digital signatures).

We assume that a node can obtain an authenticated key for any other node. Like public keys in systems using asymmetric cryptography, these keys in our protocol TIK (Section V) are public values (once disclosed), although TIK uses only symmetric (not asymmetric) cryptography. A traditional approach to this authenticated key distribution problem is to build on a public key system for key distribution; a trusted entity can sign public-key certificates for each node, and the nodes can then use their public-key to sign a new (symmetric) key being distributed for use in TIK. Zhou and Haas [42] propose such a public-key infrastructure; Hubaux *et al.* bootstrap trust relationships from PGP-like certificates without relying on a trusted public-key infrastructure [15]; Kong *et al.* [22] propose asymmetric mechanisms for threshold signatures for certificates. Alternatively, a trusted node can securely distribute an authenticated TIK key using only symmetric-key cryptography [29] or noncryptographic approaches [37].

IV. DETECTING WORMHOLE ATTACKS

In this section, we introduce the notion of a *packet leash* as a general mechanism for detecting and, thus defending against wormhole attacks. A leash is any information that is added to a packet designed to restrict the packet's maximum allowed transmission distance. Leashes are designed to protect against wormholes over a single wireless transmission; when packets are sent over multiple hops, each transmission requires the use of a new leash. We distinguish between *geographical leashes* and *temporal leashes*. A geographical leash ensures that the recipient of the packet is within a certain distance from the sender. A temporal leash ensures that the packet has an upper bound on its lifetime, which restricts the maximum travel distance, since the packet can travel at most at the speed-of-light. Either type of leash can prevent the wormhole attack, because it allows the receiver of a packet to detect if the packet traveled further than the leash allows.

A. Geographical Leashes

To construct a geographical leash, in general, each node must know its own location, and all nodes must have loosely synchronized clocks. When sending a packet, the sending node includes in the packet its own location p_s , and the time at which it sent the packet t_s ; when receiving a packet, the receiving node compares these values to its own location p_r , and the time at which it received the packet t_r . If the clocks of the sender and receiver are synchronized to within $\pm\Delta$, and ν is an upper bound on the velocity of any node, then the receiver can compute an upper bound on the distance between the sender and itself d_{sr} . Specifically,

based on the timestamp t_s in the packet, the local receive time t_r , the maximum relative error in location information δ , and the locations of the receiver p_r and the sender p_s , then d_{sr} can be bounded by $d_{sr} \leq \|p_s - p_r\| + 2\nu \cdot (t_r - t_s + \Delta) + \delta$. A standard digital signature scheme or other authentication technique can be used to enable a receiver to authenticate the location and timestamp in the received packet. This approach is similar to [10].

In certain circumstances, bounding the distance between the sender and receiver, d_{sr} , cannot prevent wormhole attacks; for example, when obstacles prevent communication between two nodes that would otherwise be in transmission range, a distance-based scheme would still allow wormholes between the sender and receiver. A network that uses location information to create a geographical leash could control even these kinds of wormholes. To accomplish this, each node would have a radio propagation model. A receiver could verify that every possible location of the sender (a $\delta + \nu(t_r - t_s + 2\Delta)$ radius around p_s) can reach every possible location of the receiver (a $\delta + \nu(t_r - t_s + 2\Delta)$ radius around p_r).

B. Temporal Leashes

To construct a temporal leash, in general, all nodes must have tightly synchronized clocks, such that maximum difference between any two nodes' clocks is Δ . The value of the parameter Δ must be known by all nodes in the network, and for temporal leashes, generally must be on the order of a few microseconds or even hundreds of nanoseconds. This level of time synchronization can be achieved now with off-the-shelf hardware based on LORAN-C [24], WWVB [25], GPS [7], [39], or on-chip atomic clocks currently under development at NIST [21]; although such hardware is not currently a common part of wireless network nodes, it can be deployed in networks today and is expected to become more widely utilized in future systems at reduced expense, size, weight, and power consumption. Although our general requirement for time synchronization is indeed a restriction on the applicability of temporal leashes, for applications that require defense against the wormhole attack, this requirement is justified due to the seriousness of the attack and its potential disruption of the intended functioning of the network.

To use temporal leashes, when sending a packet, the sending node includes in the packet the time at which it sent the packet t_s ; when receiving a packet, the receiving node compares this value to the time at which it received the packet t_r . The receiver is, thus, able to detect if the packet traveled too far, based on the claimed transmission time and the speed-of-light. Alternatively, a temporal leash can be constructed by instead including in the packet an expiration time, after which the receiver should not accept the packet; based on the allowed maximum transmission distance and the speed-of-light, the sender sets this expiration time in the packet as an offset from the time at which it sends the packet. As with a geographical leash, a regular digital signature scheme or other authentication technique can be used to allow a receiver to authenticate a timestamp or expiration time in the received packet.

C. Discussion

An advantage of geographical leashes over temporal leashes is that the time synchronization can be much looser. Another

advantage of using geographical leashes in conjunction with a signature scheme (i.e., a signature providing nonrepudiation), is that an attacker can be caught if it pretends to reside at multiple locations. This use of nonrepudiation was also proposed by Sirois and Kent [36]. When a legitimate node overhears the attacker claiming to be in different locations that would only be possible if the attacker could travel at a velocity above the maximum node velocity ν , the legitimate node can use the signed locations to convince other legitimate nodes that the attacker is malicious.

We define $\delta'(t)$ to be a bound on the maximum relative position error when any node determines its own location twice within a period of time t . By definition, $\delta'(t) \leq 2\delta$. In addition, when t is small, $\delta'(t)$ should be small, since the algorithm a node uses to determine its location should be aware of physical speed limits of that node. If some node claims to be at locations p_1 and p_2 at times t_1 and t_2 , respectively, that node is an attacker if $(\|p_2 - p_1\| - \delta'(|t_2 - t_1|))/|t_2 - t_1| > \nu$. A legitimate node detecting this from these two packets can also broadcast the two packets to convince other nodes that the first node is indeed an attacker. Each node hearing these messages can check the two signatures, verify the discrepancy in the information, and rebroadcast the information if it has not previously done so. To easily perform duplicate suppression in rebroadcasting this information, each node can maintain a *blacklist*, with each entry in the blacklist containing a node address and the time at which that blacklist entry expires. When a node receives a message showing an attacker's behavior, it checks if that attacker is already listed in its blacklist. If so, it updates the expiration time on its current blacklist entry and discards the new message; otherwise, it adds a new blacklist entry and propagates the message.

A potential problem with leashes using a timestamp in the packet is that in a contention-based MAC protocol, the sender may not know the precise time at which it will transmit a packet it is sending. For example, a sender using the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol may not know the time a packet will be transmitted until approximately one slot time (20 μ s) prior to transmission. Generating an inefficient digital signature, such as RSA with a 1024-bit key, could take three orders of magnitude more time than this slot time (on the order of 10 ms). The sender, however, can use two approaches to hide this signature generation latency: either increase the *minimum* transmission unit to allow computation to overlap with transmission, or use a more efficient signature scheme, such as Schnorr's signature [35], which enables efficient signature generation after preprocessing.

V. TEMPORAL LEASHES AND THE TIK PROTOCOL

In this section, we discuss temporal leashes in more detail and present the design and operation of our TIK protocol that implements temporal leashes.

A. Temporal Leash Construction Details

We now discuss temporal leashes that are implemented with a packet expiration time. We consider a sender who wants to send a packet with a temporal leash, preventing the packet from traveling further than distance L . (All nodes are time synchronized up to a maximum time synchronization error Δ .) Thus, $L > L_{\min} = \Delta \cdot c$, where c is the propagation speed of our

wireless signal (i.e., the speed-of-light in air, which is very close to the speed-of-light in a vacuum). When the sender sends the packet at local time t_s , it needs to set the packet expiration time to $t_e = t_s + L/c - \Delta$. When the receiver receives the packet at local time t_r , it further processes the packet if the temporal leash has not expired (i.e., $t_r < t_e$); otherwise, it drops the packet. This assumes that the packet sending and receiving delay are negligible, such that the sender can predict the precise sending time t_s and the receiver can immediately record t_r when the first bit arrives (or derive t_r during reception since the bit rate of transmission is known).

The receiver needs a way to authenticate the expiration time t_e , as otherwise an attacker could easily change that time and wormhole the packet as far as it desires. Two traditional approaches for authentication fail for this application.

- *Symmetric message authentication codes* require $O(n^2)$ private keys to be established in a network of n nodes and have high overhead when used for broadcast authentication, especially in dense networks, since one authenticator must be included for each destination
- *Digital signatures* are usually based on computationally expensive *asymmetric* cryptography; for example, the popular 1024-bit RSA digital signature algorithm [34] requires about 10 ms on an 800 MHz Pentium III processor for signature generation.

Since many wireless applications rely heavily on broadcast communication, and since setting up $O(n^2)$ keys is expensive, we design the TIK protocol in Section V-C, based on a new protocol for efficient broadcast authentication that simultaneously provides the functionality of a temporal leash.

B. Tree-Authenticated Values

The TIK protocol we present in Section V-C requires an efficient mechanism for authenticating keys. In this section, we discuss the efficient hash tree authentication mechanism.

1) *Hash Tree*: To authenticate the sequence of values v_0, v_1, \dots, v_{w-1} , we place these values at the leaf nodes of a binary tree. (For simplicity, we assume a balanced binary tree, so w is a power of 2.) We first "blind" all the values with a one-way hash function H to prevent disclosing additional values (as we will describe below), so $v'_i = H(v_i)$ for each i . We then use the Merkle hash tree construction [23] to commit to the values v'_0, \dots, v'_{w-1} . Each internal node of the binary tree is derived from its two child nodes. Consider the derivation of the parent node m_p from the left and right child nodes, m_l and m_r , respectively: $m_p = H(m_l || m_r)$. We compute each level of the tree recursively, from the leaf nodes to the root node. Fig. 1 shows this construction over the eight values v_0, v_1, \dots, v_7 , with $m_{01} = H(v'_0 || v'_1)$, $m_{03} = H(m_{01} || m_{23})$, and so on.

The root value of the tree is used to authenticate all leaf values. To authenticate a value v_i , the sender discloses i , v_i , and all values necessary to verify the path up to the root of the tree. For example, if a sender wants to authenticate key v_2 in Fig. 1, it includes the values v'_3, m_{01} , and m_{47} in the packet. A receiver with an authentic root value m_{07} can then verify that

$$H [H [m_{01} || H [H [v_2] || v'_3]] || m_{47}]$$

equals the stored m_{07} . If the verification is successful, the receiver knows that v_2 is authentic.




Fig. 1. Merkle hash tree.

The extra v'_0, v'_1, \dots, v'_7 in Fig. 1 are added to the tree to avoid disclosing (in this example) the value v_3 in order to authenticate v_2 .

2) *Hash Tree Optimization*: In TIK, the depth of the hash tree can be quite large: given a fixed time interval I , the tree is of depth $\lceil \log_2(t/I) \rceil$, where t is the amount of time between rekeying. For example, if the time interval is $11.5 \mu\text{s}$ and nodes can be rekeyed once per day, then the tree is of depth 34. As a result, storing the entire tree is impractical.

It is possible, however, to store only the upper layers of the tree and to recompute the lower layers on demand. To reconstruct a subtree of depth d requires 2^{d-1} applications of the pseudorandom function (PRF) and $2^d - 1$ applications of the hash function, but this technique saves a factor of 2^{d-1} in storage. This technique can also be further improved by amortizing this calculation. Specifically, a node keeps two trees of depth d : one that is fully computed and currently being used, and one that is being filled in. Since a total of $2^{d-1} + 2^d - 1$ operations are required to fill in the tree, and the full tree will be used for 2^{d-1} time intervals, the node needs to perform only three operations per time interval, independent of the size of the tree. For example, in the tree in Fig. 1, we may choose to recompute the $m_{01}, m_{23}, m_{45}, m_{67}$ values on demand. Then, we will store the m_{03}, m_{47}, m_{07} values. During each time interval, we perform three operations; for example, during the time interval in which v_0 is used, we recompute v_2 and v_3 using the pseudorandom function, and compute $v'_2 = H(v_2)$. The next time interval, we compute $v'_3 = H(v_3)$ and $m_{23} = H(v'_2 || v'_3)$.

We can now compute the true calculation and storage cost for the hash tree that we use in TIK. Let D be the depth of the entire tree, and let d be the depth of the part of the tree that is recomputed on demand. The initial computation of the tree requires 2^{D-1} evaluations of the PRF, and $2^D - 1$ evaluations of the hash function. This initial computation can be done offline and is not time-critical. To choose d , we consider the value of d that minimizes the total storage needed for the tree. Since total storage is given by $2^{D-d+1} - 1 + 2 \cdot (2^d - 1)$, storage for the tree is minimized when

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial}{\partial d}(2^{D-d+1} - 1 + 2^{d+1} - 2) &= 0 \\ (-\ln 2)2^{D-d+1} + (\ln 2)2^{d+1} &= 0 \\ 2^{d+1} &= 2^{D-d+1} \\ d+1 &= D-d+1. \end{aligned}$$

TABLE I
NOTATION USED IN TIK

\mathcal{F}	A pseudo-random function [11] selected by the sender
\mathcal{X}	A master secret key selected by the sender
K_i	A key generated by the sender expiring at time T_i
T_i	The expiration time for key K_i
I	The key expiration interval $T_{i+1} - T_i$
m	The root of the Merkle tree computed over all K_i values
w	The number of keys covered by a single Merkle tree
Δ	The maximum time synchronization error between any two network nodes
τ	An upper bound on the travel time of a legitimate packet
r	The maximum range traveled by a legitimate packet
c	The speed of light
P	A packet
t_r	An upper bound, relative to the sender's clock, of the time that the destination will receive the HMAC
M	A message

The optimal choice for d is $D/2$, and the total storage requirement for the tree is $2^{\lceil D/2 \rceil + 1} + 2^{\lfloor D/2 \rfloor + 1} - 3$. This represents a storage requirement of just $O(\sqrt{t/I})$. For example, a tree of depth 34 requires only 2.5 MB to store, much smaller than the full tree size of 170 GB; once the tree is generated, it can be used at a cost of three operations per time interval.

A similar approach can be taken for the generation of future hash trees. That is, once a single hash tree has been generated, each future hash tree can be generated while the current one is used, for a cost of three hash functions per time interval plus total storage space for the tree of $2^{\lceil D/2 \rceil + 1} + 2^{\lfloor D/2 \rfloor + 1} - 2$. Only the root of each new tree needs to be distributed, and as mentioned in Section III, these values can be distributed using only symmetric-key cryptography [29], noncryptographic approaches [37], or by sending them using the current hash tree for authentication.

C. TIK Protocol Description

Our TIK protocol implements temporal leases and provides efficient instant authentication for broadcast communication in wireless networks. TIK stands for *TESLA with instant key disclosure*, and is an extension of the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol [28]. The intuition behind TIK is that the packet transmission time can be significantly longer than the time synchronization error. In these cases, the a receiver can verify the TESLA *security condition* (that the corresponding key has not yet been disclosed) as it receives the packet (explained below); this fact allows the sender to disclose the key in the same packet, thus motivating the protocol name ‘‘TESLA with instant key disclosure.’’

TIK implements a temporal lease and, thus, enables the receiver to detect a wormhole attack. TIK is based on efficient *symmetric* cryptographic primitives (a message authentication code is a symmetric cryptographic primitive). TIK requires accurate time synchronization between all communicating parties, and requires each communicating node to know just one public value for each sender node, thus enabling scalable key distribution.

We now describe the different stages of the TIK protocol in detail: sender setup, receiver bootstrapping, and sending and verifying authenticated packets. The notation used in this section is summarized in Table I.




Fig. 2. Timing of a packet in transmission using TIK.

1) *Sender Setup*: The sender uses a pseudorandom function (PRF) [11] \mathcal{F} and a secret master key \mathcal{X} to derive a series of keys K_0, K_1, \dots, K_w , where $K_i = \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{X}}(i)$. The main advantage of this method of key generation is that the sender can efficiently access the keys in any order. Assuming the PRF is secure, it is computationally intractable for an attacker to find the master secret key \mathcal{X} , even if all keys K_0, K_1, \dots, K_{w-1} are known. Without the secret master key \mathcal{X} , it is computationally intractable for an attacker to derive a key K_i that the sender has not yet disclosed. To construct the PRF function \mathcal{F} , we can use a pseudorandom permutation, i.e., a block cipher [12], or a message authentication code, such as HMAC [4].

The sender selects a key expiration interval I and, thus, determines a schedule with which each of its keys will expire. Specifically, key K_0 expires at time T_0 , key K_1 expires at time $T_1 = T_0 + I, \dots$, and key K_i expires at time $T_i = T_{i-1} + I = T_0 + i \cdot I$.

The sender constructs the Merkle hash tree we describe in Section V-B to commit to the keys K_0, K_1, \dots, K_{w-1} . The root of the resulting hash tree is $m_{0,w-1}$, or simply m . The value m commits to all keys and is used to authenticate any leaf key efficiently. As we describe in Section V-B, in a hash tree with $\log_2(w)$ levels, verification requires only $\log_2 w$ hash function computations (in the worst case, not considering buffering), and the authentication information consists of $\log_2 w$ values.

2) *Receiver Bootstrapping*: We assume that all nodes have synchronized clocks with a maximum clock synchronization error of Δ . We further assume that each receiver knows every sender's hash tree root m , and the associated parameters T_0 and I . This information is sufficient for the receiver to authenticate any packets from the sender.

3) *Sending and Verifying Authenticated Packets*: To achieve secure broadcast authentication, it must not be possible for a receiver to forge authentication information for a packet. When the sender sends a packet P , it estimates an upper bound t_r on the arrival time of the HMAC at the receiver. Based on this arrival time, the sender picks a key K_i that will not have expired when the receiver receives the packet's HMAC ($T_i > t_r + \Delta$). The sender attaches the HMAC to the packet, computed using key K_i , and later discloses the key K_i itself, along with the corresponding tree authentication values (as discussed in Section V-B), after the key has expired.

Because of the time synchronization, the receiver can verify after receiving the packet that the key K_i used to compute the

authentication has not yet been disclosed, since the receiver knows the expiration time for each key and the sender only discloses the key after it expires; thus, no attacker can know K_i and, therefore, if the packet authentication verifies correctly once the receiver later receives the authentic key K_i , the packet must have originated from the claimed sender. Even another receiver could not have forged a new message with a correct message authentication code, since only the sender knew the key K_i at the time t_r that the receiver received the packet. After the key K_i expires at time T_i , the sender then discloses key K_i (and the corresponding tree authentication values); once the receiver gets the authentic key K_i , it can authenticate all packets that carry a message authentication code computed with K_i . This use of delayed key disclosure and time synchronization for secure broadcast authentication was also used by the TESLA protocol [28].

The above protocol has the drawback that message authentication is delayed; the receiver must wait for the key before it can authenticate the packet. We observe that we can remove the authentication delay in an environment in which the nodes are tightly time synchronized. In fact, the sender can even disclose the key in the same packet that carries the corresponding message authentication code.

Fig. 2 shows the sending and receiving of a TIK packet. The figure shows the sender's and receiver's timelines, which may differ by a value of up to the maximum time synchronization error Δ . The time t_s here is the time at which the sender S begins transmission of the packet, and time T_i is the disclosure time for key K_i . The packet contains four parts: a message authentication code (shown as HMAC in Fig. 2), a message payload (shown as M), the tree authentication values necessary to authenticate K_i (shown as T), and the key used to generate the message authentication code (shown as K_i). The TIK packet is transmitted by S as

$$S \rightarrow R : \langle \text{HMAC}_{K_i}(M), M, T, K_i \rangle$$

where the destination R may be unicast or broadcast. After the receiver R receives the HMAC value, it verifies that the sender did not yet start sending the corresponding key K_i , based on the time T_i and the synchronized clocks. If the sender did not yet start sending K_i , the receiver verifies that the key K_i at the end of the packet is authentic (using the hash tree root m and the hash tree values T), and then uses K_i to verify the HMAC

value in the packet. If all these verifications are successful, the receiver accepts the packet as authentic.

The TIK protocol already provides protection against the wormhole attack, since an attacker who retransmits the packet will most likely delay it long enough that the receiver will reject the packet because the corresponding key has already expired and the sender may have disclosed it. However, we can also add an explicit expiration timestamp to each packet for the temporal leash, and use TIK as the authentication protocol. For example, each packet could include a 64-bit timestamp with nanosecond resolution, allowing over 580 years of use starting from the epoch. Since the entire packet is authenticated, the timestamp is authenticated.

A policy could be set allowing the reception of packets for which the perceived transmission delay, i.e., the arrival time minus the sending timestamp, is less than some threshold. That threshold could be chosen anywhere between $\tau - \Delta$ and $\tau + \Delta$, where the more conservative approach of $\tau - \Delta$ never allows tunnels but rejects some valid packets, and the more liberal approach of $\tau + \Delta$ never rejects valid packets, but may allow tunneling of up to $2c\Delta$ past the actual normal transmission range.

With a GPS-disciplined clock [39], time synchronization to within $\Delta = 183$ ns with probability $1 - 10^{-10}$ is possible. If a transmitter has a 250 m range, the $\tau - \Delta$ threshold accepts all packets sent less than 140 m and some packets sent between 140 and 250 m; the $\tau + \Delta$ threshold accepts all packets sent less than 250 m but allows tunneling of packets up to 110 m beyond that distance.

D. MAC Layer Considerations

A time-division multiple-access (TDMA) MAC protocol may be able to choose the time at which a frame begins transmission, so that the message authentication code is sent by time $T_i - r/c - 2\Delta$. In this case, the minimum payload length is $r/c + 2\Delta$ times the bit rate of transmission. For additional efficiency, different nodes should have different key disclosure times, and the MAC layer should provide each node with the MAC layer time slot it needs for authenticated delivery.

As mentioned in Section V-C, a carrier sense multiple-access (CSMA) MAC protocol may not be able to control that time at which a frame is sent relative to the key disclosure times. In this case, the minimum payload length needs to be chosen so that a key disclosure time is guaranteed to occur somewhere during the packet's transmission. For example, if the network physical layer is capable of a peak data rate of 100 Mb/s and a range of 150 m, and if the key disclosure interval is chosen to be $25 \mu\text{s}$ and time synchronization is achieved to within 250 ns, then the minimum packet size must be at least 325 bytes. However, if each value in the hash tree is 80 bits long, and the depth of the tree is 31, then the minimum payload size is just 15 bytes.

If a MAC protocol uses a request-to-send/clear-to-send (RTS/CTS) frame handshake, the minimum packet size can be reduced by carrying the message authentication code inside the RTS frame. In this case, the frame exchange for transmitting a data packet would be

$$\begin{aligned} A &\rightarrow B : \langle \text{RTS}, \text{HMAC}_{K_i}(M) \rangle \\ B &\rightarrow A : \langle \text{CTS} \rangle \\ A &\rightarrow B : \langle \text{DATA}, M, \text{tree values}, K_i \rangle. \end{aligned}$$

In particular, instead of having a minimum message size of $(r/c) + 2\Delta + I$ times the transmission data rate, where I is the duration of a time interval, the minimum message size is just $2\Delta + I - 2t_{\text{turn}}$ times the data rate, where t_{turn} is the minimum allowed time between receiving a control frame (i.e., the RTS or CTS) and returning a corresponding frame (the CTS or DATA frame, respectively). This minimum message length includes the length of the CTS, DATA header, payload, and hash tree values.

VI. EVALUATION

A. TIK Performance

To evaluate the suitability of our work for use in ad hoc networks, we measured computational power and memory currently available in mobile devices. To measure the number of repeated hashes that can be computed per second, we optimized the MD5 hash code from Information Sciences Institute (ISI) [38] to achieve maximum performance for repeated hashing.

Our optimized version performs 10 million hash function evaluations in 7.544 s on a Pentium III running at 1 GHz, representing a rate of 1.3 million hashes per second; the same number of hashes using this implementation on a Compaq iPAQ 3870 PocketPC running Linux took 45 s, representing a rate of 222 000 hashes per second. Repetitive, simple functions like hashes can also be efficiently implemented in hardware; Helion Technology [13] claims a 20 k gate ASIC core design (a third the complexity of Bluetooth [3] and less than a third the complexity of IEEE 802.11 [19]) capable of more than 1.9 million hashes per second and a Xilinx FPGA design using 1650 LUT's capable of 1 million hashes per second. In terms of memory consumption, existing handheld devices, such as the iPAQ 3870, come equipped with 32 MB of Flash and 64 MB of RAM. Modern notebooks can generally be equipped with hundreds of megabytes of RAM.

A high-end wireless LAN card such as the Proxim Harmony 802.11a [32] has a transmission range potentially as far as 250 m and data rate as high as 108 Mb/s. With time synchronization provided by a Trimble Thunderbolt GPS-Disciplined Clock [39], the synchronization error can be as low as 183 ns with probability $1 - 10^{-10}$. If authentic keys are reestablished every day, with a 20-byte minimum packet size and an 80-bit message authentication code length, the tree has depth 33, giving a minimum payload length of 350 bytes (a transmission time of $25.9 \mu\text{s}$) and a time interval of $24.7 \mu\text{s}$. Assuming that the node generates each new tree while it is using its current tree, it requires 8 MB of storage and needs to perform fewer than 243 000 operations per second to maintain and generate trees. To authenticate a received packet, a node needs to perform only 33 hash functions. To keep up with link-speed, a node needs to verify a packet at most every $25.9 \mu\text{s}$, thus requiring 1 273 000 hashes per second, for a total computational requirement of 1 516 000 hashes per second. This can be achieved today in hardware, either by placing two MD5 units on a single FPGA, or with an ASIC. Many laptops today are equipped with at least 1.2 GHz Pentium III CPU's, which should also be able to perform 1.5 million hash operations per second.

Current commodity wireless LAN products such as commonly used IEEE 802.11b cards [2] provide a transmission

data rate of 11 Mb/s and a range of 250 m. Given the same time synchronization, rekeying interval, minimum packet size, and message authentication code length, the tree has depth 30, giving a minimum payload length of 320 bytes (a transmission time of 232 μ s) and a time interval of 231.5 μ s. Assuming that the node generates each new tree while it is using its current tree, it requires just 2.6 megabytes of storage and needs to perform just 26 500 operations per second. To authenticate a received packet, a node needs to perform only 30 hash functions. Since any IP packet authenticated using TIK would take at least 232 μ s to transmit in this example, TIK can authenticate packets at link-speed using just 13 000 hashes per second, for a total of 39 500 hash functions per second, which is well within the capability of an iPAQ, with 82.2% of its CPU time to spare.

In a sensor network such as Hollar *et al.*'s weC mote [18], [41], nodes may only be able to achieve time synchronization accurate to 1 s, have a 19.6 kb/s link speed, and 20 m range. In this case, the smallest packet that can be authenticated is 4900 bytes; since the weC mote does not have sufficient memory to store this packet, TIK is unusable in such a resource-scarce system. Furthermore, the level of time synchronization in this system is such that TIK could not provide a usable wormhole detection system.

B. Security Analysis

Packet leashes provide a way for a sender and a receiver to ensure that a wormhole attacker is not causing the signal to propagate farther than the specified normal transmission distance. When geographic leashes are used, nodes also detect tunneling across obstacles such as mountains that are otherwise impenetrable by radio. As with other cryptographic primitives, a malicious receiver can refuse to check the leash, just like a malicious receiver can refuse to check the authentication on a packet. This may allow an attacker to tunnel a packet to another attacker without detection; however, that second attacker cannot then retransmit the packet as if it were the original sender without then being detected.

A malicious sender can claim a false timestamp or location, causing a legitimate receiver to have mistaken beliefs about whether or not the packet was tunneled. When geographic leashes are used in conjunction with digital signatures, nodes may be able to detect a malicious node and spread that information to other nodes, as discussed in Section IV-C. However, this attack is equivalent to the malicious sender sharing its keys with the wormhole attacker, allowing the sending side of the wormhole to place appropriate timestamps or location information on any packets sent by the malicious sender that are then tunneled by the wormhole attacker. Moreover, if a malicious or compromised node embeds a future timestamp into the packet to extend its lifetime (in the case of temporal leashes), neighboring nodes can detect such fraudulent packets and blacklist the node.

C. Comparison Between Geographic and Temporal Leashes

Temporal leashes have the advantage of being highly efficient, especially when used with TIK, as described in Section V. Geographic leashes, on the other hand, require a more general broadcast authentication mechanism, which may result in




Fig. 3. These two network topologies are not distinguishable by topology-based wormhole detection, yet one contains a wormhole and the other does not. The dotted line in the figure on the left represents the wormhole.

increased computational and network overhead. Location information also may require more bits to represent, further increasing the network overhead.

Geographic leashes have the advantage that they can be used in conjunction with a radio propagation model, thus allowing them to detect tunnels through obstacles. Furthermore, geographic leashes do not require the tight time synchronization that temporal leashes do. In particular, temporal leashes cannot be used if the maximum range is less than $c\Delta$, where c is the speed-of-light and Δ is maximum clock synchronization error; geographic leashes can be used until the maximum range is less than $2\nu\Delta$, where ν is the maximum movement speed of any node.

To evaluate the practicality of geographic leashes, we consider a radio of range 300 m, maximum movement speed of 50 m/s, a relative positioning error of 3 m, and time synchronization error of 1 ms. Then, $t_r - t_s \leq 2$ ms, since the propagation time is at most 1 ms and the time synchronization error is at most 1 ms. Then, $d_{sr} \leq \|p_s - p_r\| + 100 \text{ m/s} \cdot 2 \text{ ms} + 3 \text{ m} = \|p_s - p_r\| + 3.2 \text{ m}$. Since $\|p_s - p_r\|$ could be as much as 3 m, the effective transmission range of the network interface is reduced by at most 6.2 m.

To compare the effectiveness of geographic leashes and temporal leashes, we compare the distance derived using each approach: $d_{sr} \leq \|p_s - p_r\| + 2\nu \cdot (t_r - t_s + \Delta) + \delta$ for geographic leashes and $d_{sr} \leq c \cdot (t_r - t_s + \Delta)$ for temporal leashes. We use d_{\max}/c to denote the maximum propagation time. Then, the maximum error is bounded by $\delta + 2\nu \cdot ((d_{\max}/c) + 2\Delta) + \delta = 2\delta + 4\nu\Delta + 2\nu(d_{\max}/c)$ for geographic leashes, and by $2c\Delta$ for temporal leashes. Geographic leashes are then more effective when $\delta < c\Delta - 2\nu\Delta - (\nu/c)d_{\max}$. In general, ν is much smaller than c . Given sufficient computing power and network bandwidth, geographic leashes should be used when $\delta < c\Delta$, and temporal leashes should be used when $\delta \geq c\Delta$.

D. Security of Topology-Based Approaches

Several researchers [31], [40] have proposed a method to detect wormholes by constructing a model of the network topology based on inaccurate distance measurements between neighbor nodes that can receive packets from each other (possibly through a wormhole); wormholes can then be visualized in this topology by the anomalies they introduce, bending the topology so that the nodes on either side of the wormhole appear closer together. However, such topology-based approaches alone cannot detect all wormholes. For example, the two network topologies in Fig. 3 are indistinguishable, yet

one contains a wormhole and the other does not. In addition, a wormhole that can decode packets can choose to tunnel only traffic between two select nodes over a short distance; such wormholes have a minimal impact on network topology and may not be easily detected by such approaches.

VII. RELATED WORK

Hu and Evans propose to use directional antennas to detect wormhole attacks [14]. Their approach uses a periodic HELLO message to determine the direction to each neighbor. When two nodes A and B wish to communicate, they find a correctly positioned *verifier* V which ensures that the directions toward A and B are consistent. Their approach is promising; however, it relies on perfectly aligned, completely directional antennas, and cannot detect all wormhole instances, especially those using more than one wormhole.

Wang *et al.* note that the wormhole attack is potentially more powerful when the attacker has compromised one or more nodes. In particular, they distinguish between *open*, *half-open*, and *closed* wormholes. In this paper, we focus on open wormholes, where the wormhole does not participate in higher layer protocols (such as routing). In a half-open wormhole, one end of the wormhole participates in a higher layer protocol, and may attempt to conceal the existence of the wormhole. Finally, in a closed wormhole, both ends of the wormhole participate in the higher layer protocol. Our mechanisms allow a higher layer protocol to detect the presence of open wormholes; additional mechanisms within that higher layer protocol are required in order to prevent use of half-open and closed wormholes.

Radio frequency (RF) watermarking [9] is another possible approach to providing the security described in this paper. RF watermarking authenticates a wireless transmission by modulating the RF waveform in a way known only to authorized nodes. RF watermarking relies on keeping secret the knowledge of which RF waveform parameters are being modulated; furthermore, if that waveform is exactly captured at the receiving end of the wormhole and exactly replicated at the transmitting end of the wormhole, the signal level of the resulting watermark is independent of the distance it was tunneled. In addition, since we are aware of no published specific details, it is difficult to assess its security. If the radio hardware is kept secret, such as through tamper-resistant modules, some level of security can be provided against compromised nodes; however, if the radio band in which communications are taking place is known, then an attacker can attempt to tunnel the entire signal from one location to another.

It may be possible to modify existing intrusion detection approaches to detect a wormhole attacker; since the packets sent by the wormhole are identical to the packets sent by legitimate nodes, such detection would more easily be achieved jointly with hardware able to specify some sort of direction of arrival information for received packets. To the best of our knowledge, no work has been published regarding the possibility of using intrusion detection systems specifically to detect wormhole attackers.

Brands and Chaum [6] propose a three-way handshake which bounds the distance between a node and a verifier by measuring the round trip time between them. Our technique is able to detect wormholes with only a single message, and requires corrections for clock skew between the sender and receiver.

TESLA generally chooses longer time intervals than TIK does, in order to reduce the amount of computation needed to authenticate a new key. As a result, TESLA is capable of functioning with much looser time synchronization than is required by TIK. Given a sufficient level of time synchronization, TIK provides an advantage over hop-by-hop authentication with TESLA, with respect to latency and packet overhead, but it suffers with respect to byte overhead. In particular, since TIK key disclosure always occurs in the same packet as the data protected, packets can be verified instantly; with TESLA, on the other hand, packets must wait, on average 1.5 time intervals, which is especially significant when packets are authenticated hop-by-hop, as may be required in a multihop ad hoc network routing protocol.

Some medium access control protocols also specify privacy and authenticity mechanisms. These mechanisms typically use one or more shared keys, allowing compromised nodes to forge packets. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, none of these mechanisms protect against wormhole attacks.

VIII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have introduced the *wormhole attack*, a powerful attack that can have serious consequences on many proposed ad hoc network routing protocols; the wormhole attack may also be exploited in other types of networks and applications, such as wireless access control systems based on physical proximity. To detect and defend against the wormhole attack, we introduced *packet leashes*, which may be either *geographic* or *temporal* leashes, to restrict the maximum transmission distance of a packet. Finally, to implement temporal leashes, we presented the design and performance analysis of a novel, efficient protocol, called TIK, which also provides instant authentication of received packets.

TIK requires just n public keys in a network with n nodes, and has relatively modest storage, per packet size, and computation overheads. In particular, a node needs to perform only between three and six hash function evaluations per time interval to maintain up-to-date key information for itself, and roughly 30 hash functions for each received packet. With commodity hardware such as 11 Mb/s wireless links, TIK has computational and memory requirements that are easily satisfiable today; 2.6 MB for hash tree storage represents, for example, less than 3% of the standard memory on an Compaq iPAQ 3870 with no external memory cards, and since the StrongARM CPU on the iPAQ is capable of performing 222 000 symmetric cryptographic operations per second, TIK imposes no more than an 18% load on CPU time, even when flooded with packets at the maximum speed of the wireless network, and normally uses less CPU load than that in normal operation.

When used in conjunction with precise timestamps and tight clock synchronization, TIK can prevent wormhole attacks that cause the signal to travel a distance longer than the nominal

range of the radio, or any other range that might be specified. Sufficiently tight clock synchronization can be achieved in a wireless LAN using commercial GPS receivers [39], and wireless MAN technology could be sufficiently time-synchronized using either GPS or LORAN-C [24] radio signals.

A MAC layer protocol using TIK efficiently protects against replay, spoofing, and wormhole attacks, and ensures strong freshness. TIK is implementable with current technologies, and does not require significant additional processing overhead at the MAC layer, since the authentication of each packet can be performed on the host CPU.

Our geographic leashes are less efficient than temporal leashes, since they require broadcast authentication, but they can be used in networks where precise time synchronization is not easily achievable. The dominant factor in the usability of geographic leashes is the ability to accurately measure location; because node movement is very slow relative to the speed-of-light, the effects of reduced time synchronization accuracy are slight.

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